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Securities laws traditionally protect investors by establishing disclosure requirements Jbr issuers
under the philosophy that investors should have access to all necessary information regarding
publicly available securities, which is done by the adoption of a registration process requiring
issuers to disclose infbrmation on all significant fctors of their businesses. By balancing the
costs and benefits of existing disclosure requirements, multiple securities legislation providesJbr
transactions that are exempted from registration. This paper ojfers a comparative analysis of
the legislative and regulatory standards fir one specific exemption from securities registration
present in both the U.S. and the Brazilian capital markets: the exemption applicable to re-
stricted offerings. These two countries, comprising the largest capital markets in North and
South America, respectively, have a registration process for public offerings and also an ex-
emption from it, depending on the size and type of the offerings as well as the sophistication of
the buyers.
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I. Introduction
Securities laws serve to protect investors, and they traditionally do so by establishing
disclosure requirements for issuers under the philosophy that investors should have access
to all necessary information for them to decide whether to buy or sell a security. Most
developed capital markets have the regulatory policy of "protection through trans-
parency," by adopting a registration process requiring issuers to disclose information on
all significant factors of their business, operations, financial results and the main risk fac-
tors related thereto.I This "registration process" is the device generally put in place by
regulators to protect investors through fill and fair disclosure. 2
Although a registration process is necessary for the safety and soundness of the capital
markets, sometimes the burdens involved in such a process may render it less compelling
when considering factors such as the level of investors' sophistication, the size of the offer-
ing, the number of purchasers or the extent to which an offer is publicly marketed. By
balancing the costs and benefits of existing disclosure requirements, multiple securities
legislation provides for transactions that are exempted from registration, usually for those
transactions that are not within the meaning or scope of their legislative intent: to protect
those investors in need of protection.
Even though usually designed to achieve the same objective, some exemptions are dif-
ferent in scope, extension, and legislative background. In addition, the various securities
laws are in constant modification in order to adjust their exemptions as the markets re-
spond to them, by either increasing or reducing their scope as to the issuers and the pur-
chasers eligible to use them and also the type and size of the transactions that may be
waived from registration. Frequently, regulators in different countries may design their
rules based on other jurisdictions' successfil regulation.
In this paper I will compare the legislative and regulatory standards for one specific
registration exemption present in both the U.S. and the Brazilian capital markets: those
applicable to restricted offerings. As many other capital markets regimes, these two coun-
tries have a registration process for public offering of securities and also an exemption to
it, depending on the size and type of the offerings as well as the sophistication of the
potential or actual buyers.
1. See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Trasparency i1 Insurance Consumer
Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 400 (2014).
2. Id. at 447.
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The United States Securities Act of 19333 ("U.S. Securities Act") and the Brazilian
Securities and Exchange Act4 ("Brazilian Securities Act") set forth exemptions for re-
stricted offerings to sophisticated investors, provided that some requirements are met.
Section 4(a)(2) of the U.S. Securities Act exempts from registration with the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") those "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering. ' 6 Theoretically speaking, this exemption is based on the regulatory phi-
losophy that private transactions between an issuer and a sophisticated investor should not
be subject to the time and expense burdens of the registration process created by the
statute. Similarly, in Brazil, Section 19(5)(1) of the Brazilian Securities Act establishes that
the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissdo de Valores Mobilidrios)
("CVM") may issue rules exempting from registration any public offering when such ex-
emption would firther filfill the public interest than would the generally required regis-
tration process. 7 Although both exemptions are very similar as to their final result, which
is to allow issuers to issue and sell unregistered securities to a limited number of sophisti-
cated investors, it is important to note that they have different legal bases and historical
backgrounds.
The U.S. restricted offerings fall within the private sales exemption set forth by Section
4(a)(2) of the U.S. Securities Act,8 while in Brazil they are treated as public offerings
exempted from registration based on the authority of Section 19(5)(1) of the Brazilian
Securities Act)
Restricted offerings exemptions are suited for those gray-area transactions qualified
neither as plain public offerings nor as simple private sales of securities. Although present
in the U.S. and in Brazil, they are viewed and treated from opposite perspectives in these
two countries: as a private sale in the first case and as a public offering in the second case.
The Brazilian exemption was to some extent inspired by the U.S. regulatory experience,
but the historical difference between these two systems is not well understood. Better
comprehension of these systems may be helpfil for academics, regulators and practition-
ers interested in these two jurisdictions, and perhaps even more important to those profes-
sionals willing to contextualize and understand the current Brazilian regulation on the
matter. These historical differences impact the way restricted offering exemptions are
regulated in these two countries, particularly when we consider that the CVM has im-
ported some regulatory concepts developed over time in the U.S., despite its different
statutory and historic background, as discussed below.
3. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter Securities Act].
4. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1982 & Supp. V 1986)) [hereinafter Securities Act].
5. Section 4(2) prior to enactment of the JOBS Act.
6. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(a)(2) (original version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 4(2)).
7. Lei No. 6,385, de 7 de Dezembro de 1976, D.O.U. de 15.12.1976. (Brazil), available at http://
www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil-03/Leis/L6385original.htm.
8. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1982 & Supp. TV 1986)) [hereinafter Securities Act].
9. Lei No. 6,385, de 7 de Dezembro de 1976, D.O.U. de 15.12.1976. (Brazil), avaiahie at http://
www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil-03/Leis/L6385original.htm.
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II. Brief History of Restricted Offerings Exemption in the U.S.
Section 5(c) of the U.S. Securities Act prohibits any person, directly or indirectly, from
offering securities using the U.S. mails and also any instrumentality of "interstate com-
merce,"
10 
unless a registration statement has been filed for such securities. Section 4(a)(2)
of the U.S. Securities Act exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering" from the registration requirements of Section 5 of the U.S. Securities Act."
Sales of securities to a limited number of qualified buyers in the U.S. have traditionally
been exempted from registration through the authority of the private sale exemption pro-
vided by the U.S. Securities Act.' 2 In the U.S., private transactions between an issuer and
a sophisticated investor may not be subject to the time and expense burden of the registra-
tion process.' 3 Generally, what lies behind this concept is that an issuer may make a
specific sale of its securities to a particular person or specified group of persons without
having the costs related to registering it with the SEC.
Although this concept may seem very simple, the statute does not address the fact that
between the isolated private sale and a public offering made with general solicitation,
there is an extensive array of possibilities that makes it difficult for regulators and market
participants to define what is and what is not within this private sale exemption. In fact,
the U.S. Securities Act does not define "public offering" when it exempts "transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering,"'14 and restricted offerings are certainly a type
of gray-area transaction subject to the consequences of this lack of definition because they
are not available to the whole public, they are at the same time more than isolated private
transactions. Therefore, the restricted offerings exemption in the U.S. was historically
dependent on the courts, and the SEC's interpretation of Section 4(a)(2). In other words,
the availability of the private placement exemption to those gray-area transactions was
historically dependent on how courts and the SEC interpreted the definition of the term
"public offerings" over time.
A. SECURITIES ACT RELEASE No. 285
In 1935, two years after the enactment of the U.S. Securities Act, the SEC published
the U.S. Securities Act Release No. 285 ("Release 285"), which was the first meaningfil
guidance on the availability of the private offering exemption.' 5 In a form of a letter
authored by the former General Counsel of the SEC, four factors were considered rele-
vant for identifying what could cause a sale of security to be a private sale:
a) The number of ojferees and their relationship to each other and to the issuer: The number
of persons to whom the securities were offered-not purchasers-was a critical
inquiry. And for this purpose, the term "offer" should mean any attempt to dispose
10. Section 2(a)(7) of the U.S. Securities Act defines "interstate commerce" as the "commerce ... among
the several States or . . . between any foreign country and any State."
11. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(a)(2) (original version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 4(2)).
12. See Regulation D-Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities Without Registration
Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.500 (2013).
13. Id.
14. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(a)(2) (original version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 4(2)).
15. See Securities Act Release No. 285, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §§ 2741-2744 (Jan. 24, 1935).
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of a security. Also, the basis on which such offerees were selected could also be a
factor more important than the actual number of offerees (e.g., an offer to a prede-
termined number of persons from the general public would be considered a public
offering even though an offer to a larger number of people within a same category
of investors-participants of a specific group or class-would not be). In addition,
the previous relationship of the offerees with the issuer could be a determining
factor. If offerees are members of a class having special knowledge of the issuer,
the case for a private offering was strengthened;
b) The number of units ofkered: The issuance of securities in small number of units in
large denominations was evidence of a private offering, whereas an issuance of a
large number of units with small denominations would suggest the issuer antici-
pated public trading of such securities;
c) The size of the offering: The exemption was considered to be predominantly appli-
cable to small offerings, which were less likely to be traded even if redistributed;
and
d) The manner of offering: Transactions carried out by direct negotiations between the
issuer and a few investors were more likely to be nonpublic than those effected
through the use of "machinery of public distribution."16
This 1935 release also stated that the determination of what constituted a public offer-
ing was essentially a question of fact, in which "all surrounding circumstances were of
moment," making clear that at the time there was no "check-the-box" or objective criteria
to be followed by companies doing a nonregistered issuance. 17
For nearly two decades, Release No. 285 was the authoritative statement on the private
offering exemption, until 1953, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co. case.18
B. RALSTON PURINA STANDARD
In SEC v. Ralston Purina, the Supreme Court resolved whether Ralston Purina had of-
fered shares of stock to its own employees without first registering the sale with the SEC.
In rendering its decision, the Court remarked that the U.S. Securities Act nowhere de-
fined the scope of the private offering exemption, nor was the legislative history of much
help in regulating its boundaries.
The Court also emphasized that decisions under the statutory precursors19 of federal
securities legislation have made clear that "to be public, an offer need not be open to the
whole world," mentioning the 1938 case of SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co.,20 where that
court observed that:
16. See Securities Act Release No. 285, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §§ 2741-2744 (Jan. 24, 1935).
17. Id.
18. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 123 (1953); Cox, James D., Robert W.
Hillman, and Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials, New York: Aspen Publishers,
2009.
19. For example, the English Companies Acts and state "blue sky" laws.
20. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1938).
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In its broadest meaning the term 'public' distinguishes the populace at large from
groups of individual members of the public segregated because of some common
interest or characteristic. Yet such a distinction is inadequate for practical purposes;
manifestly, an offering of securities to all red-headed men, to all residents of Chicago
or San Francisco, to all existing stockholders of the General Motors Corporation or
the American Telephone & Telegraph Company, is no less 'public', in every realistic
sense of the word, than an unrestricted offering to the world at large. Such an offer-
ing, though not open to everyone who may choose to apply, is none the less 'public'
in character, for the means used to select the particular individuals to whom the of-
fering is to be made bear no sensible relation to the purposes for which the selection
is made .... To determine the distinction between 'public' and 'private' in any partic-
ular context, it is essential to examine the circumstances under which the distinction
is sought to be established and to consider the purposes sought to be achieved by such
distinction.2 1
In Ralston Purina, the Court affirmed that the private offering exemption should not be
construed so as to deprive corporate employees, as a class, of the safeguards of the U.S.
Securities Act. The Court agreed that some employee offerings could have been within
the purposes of the private offering exemption, such as the offering "made to executive
personnel who because of their position have access to the same kind of information that
the act would make available in the form of a registration statement," but concluded that,
absent such special circumstances, employees of Ralston Purina were just "as much mem-
bers of the investing 'public' as any of their neighbors in the community." 22
Therefore, in this leading case of 1953, the Court shifted the inquiry under Section
4(a)(2) from that under Release No. 285, remarking that the private sale exemption should
be interpreted in the light of the statutory purpose of protecting "investors by promoting
fill disclosure of information thought necessary to [make] informed investment decisions"
and held that the applicability of Section 4(a)(2) should depend on whether the particular
class of persons affected would require the protections of the U.S. Securities Act:
The design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of infor-
mation thought necessary to [make] informed investment decisions. The nanral way
to interpret the private offering exemption is in light of the statutory purpose. Since
exempt transactions are those as to which "there is no practical need for [the bill's]
application," the applicability of § 4(1)23 should turn on whether the particular class
of persons affected need the protection of the Act. An offering to those who are
shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not involving any public
offering.'24
21. Id.
22. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953)
23. Section 4 was amended on August 20, 1964 by the "Securities Acts Amendments of 1964" when the
second part of Section 4(1) was converted into Section 4(2). P.L. 88-467, § 12, 78 Stat. 580. It was again
amended on April 5, 2012, with the enactment of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) and
became Section 4(a)(2). P.L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 314, 315, 325 (codified as 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(a)(2)).
24. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 124, 125.
VOL. 48, NO. 1
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
RESTRICTED OFFERINGS 39
Therefore, Ralston Purina departed from the more objective criteria set forth by Release
No. 285-number of offerees, size of the offer, and manner of sale 25 -to a more subjec-
tive case-by-case analyses that should consider the capacity of the investors to fend for
themselves.
Release No. 285 suggested that an offering to fewer than twenty-five purchasers was
presumably a private placement,26 but, after Ralston Purina, the SEC no longer set a mini-
mum or maximum number of investors above which an offering would be considered a
public offering or below which it would be considered a private placement.
As noted by securities commentators, "most of the post-Ralston litigation concerning
the private offering exemption has centered on identifying the types of persons in need of
the protections afforded by registration and therefore ineligible subjects of private
offerings."27
In addition, after Ralston Purina, most cases centered on the question of whether sophis-
tication could replace access to information. In Hill York Corp. v. American International
Franchises,28 the Fifth Circuit decided that investors' sophistication is irrelevant if they do
not know the issuer or its business. 29 Even if the investor was sophisticated, lacking infor-
mation on the issuer would prompt the necessity of the protections of registration. 30 A
previous relationship with the issuer was an important fact evidencing access to informa-
tion. 3 1 Sophistication of purchasers was no substitute for information.32 "In SEC v. Conti-
nental Tobacco,33 the court required the issuer to prove that each offeree had a relationship
with the issuer giving access to the kind of information that registration would have dis-
closed. 34 Such information generally includes information concerning the issuer's busi-
ness, financial condition, results of operations, property, and management. In Doran v.
Petroleum Management Corp.,35 the court determined that access to information about the
issuer can be provided either through direct disclosure to the offeree or by means of effec-
tive access through family relationship, employment, or economic bargaining power."
And with this respect, a previous existing relationship with the issuer or any person acting
on its behalf in the offering was important.36
25. See Release No. 285, supra note 6.
26. Id.
2 7. See JA-mEs D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed., 2009).
28. Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 668.
31. Id.
32. For other cases that reached similar conclusions, see Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1289 (4th Cir.
1978); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Int'l Mining Exch., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1062, 1071 (D. Colo. 1981).
33. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Cont'l Tobacco Co. of South Carolina, 463 F.2d 137, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1972).
34. Id.
35. Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977).
36. "Division of Corporation Finance interpretive letters Woodtrails-Seattle, Ltd. (Aug. 9, 1982) (providing
that no general solicitation exists when an issuer or any person acting on its behalf made offers to investors in
prior limited partnerships sponsored by the general partner of the issuer); E.F. Hutton Co. (Dec. 3, 1985)
(providing that no general solicitation exists when an offer is made to customers of a broker-dealer because of
the broker's preexisting, substantive relationship with its customers; further, providing that the requisite rela-
tionship could be established through a questionnaire providing the broker-dealer with sufficient information
to evaluate the offeree's sophistication and financial situation). See also Division of Corporation Finance
interpretive letters H.B. Shaine & Co., Inc. (May 1, 1987); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. (Dec. 3, 1985)."
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So, the historical interpretation of Section 4(a)(2)'s "transactions by an issuer not in-
volving any public offering" 37 went further than just looking at those "private" face-to-
face transactions. It was not a matter of how public the offering was in § 4(a)(2)'s literal
terms. Issuers should go much further than just avoiding offering the securities through
"machinery of public distribution." 38 Even if offered and sold to three people in a closed
room, the exemption could not be available if absent the above-mentioned elements.
Courts construed the private sale exemption taking into consideration the final objec-
tive of the U.S. Securities Act, which was to protect investors who need the protection
thereof and were not able to fend for themselves or were not provided with necessary
information for them to fend for themselves. 39
Indeed, in order for Section 4(a)(2) to be available for the issuer, investors should have
received the information needed for them to make a sufficiently informed decision (disclo-
sure), plus the opportnmity to ask for more information if needed (access). 40
C. FROM STATUTORY PRIVATE SALES TO REGULATORY RESTRICTED OFFERINGS
Because the restricted offerings in the United States were carried out based on the
private sale statutory exemption, the historical construction of Section 4(a)(2) of the U.S.
Securities Act was essential to understanding its boundaries. Because of the factors shown
above, the creation of a specific regulation on restricted offerings was prompted because
of the gray areas existing between the private sales and public offerings, which the SEC
and various courts tried to clarify after the U.S. Securities Act was enacted.
As noted by Lander "for many years the private placement process was very complex
and the issuer's exemption from registration under the Securities Act was uncertain.41
These difficulties prompted various SEC regulatory initiatives that added certainty to the
private placement process. 42
So in order to throw some light on this gray area for issuers and market participants, the
SEC promulgated the safe harbor regulation called Regulation D,43 which sets forth ob-
jective criteria according to which some offerings that are more than mere face-to-face
transactions could be carried out without prompting the mandatory registration process.
As remarked by Cox et al.:
SEC Interpretation: Use of Electronic Media, Release Nos. 33 -7856,34-42728, IC-24426, 17 C.F.R. §§ 231,
241, 271, n. 84 (2013); see also, id., (noting that "one method of ensuring that general solicitation is not
involved is to establish the existence of a 'pre-existing, substantive relationship'" and that "there may be facts
and circumstances in which a third party, other than a registered broker-dealer, could established a 'pre-
existing, substantive relationship' sufficient to avoid a 'general solicitation'").
37. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 4(a)(2), 48 Stat. 74.
38. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 200 F.2d 85, 93 (8th Cir. 1952) rev'd, 346 U.S. 119
(1953).
39. Id. at 125.
40. See Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971) (Court decided that,
although sophisticated, investors lacked access to information and the offerees were in need of the protections
of registration. Sophistication of the purchasers is not a substitute for information).
41. See Guy P. LANDER, U.S. SECURITES LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND
CAPITAL MARKETS § 5 (2nd ed. 2009).
42. See id.
43. Regulation D-Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities Without Registration Under
the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.500 (2013).
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Regulation D is a response to conditions of the 1970s that made it unnecessarily diffi-
cult for small business to raise capital. With significant costs and delays attendant to the
registration statement, the availability of exemptions from registration obligations assumes
critical importance. Yet often issuers found compliance with available exemptions to be
difficult or even impossible. In response.., the SEC in the early 1980s moved to replace
the existing patchwork scheme of exemptions with a more integrated, liberal, and coher-
ent set of exemptions.
44
After the enactment of Regulation D, issuers intending to do a restricted offering did
not need to rely on the uncertainties of the statutory private placement exemption and its
interpretation by the courts, so long as they met the new safe harbor regulatory
requirements.
Regulation D is comprised of Rules 501 through 508. 41 Rules 504, 505 and 506 are the
rules actually creating the safe harbors; 46 Rules 504 and 505 are applicable to small offer-
ings under Section 3(b) of the U.S. Securities Act, and Rule 506 are applicable to private
offerings under Section 4(a)(2) of the U.S. Securities Act. 4 7 The rest of Regulation D
(Rules 501, 502, 503, 507, and 508) provides definitions and general conditions applicable
to each of the three safe harbors (Rules 504, 505 and 506).4 8
For the purposes of this article, I will focus on Rule 506.
1. Rule 506 of Regulation D
Rule 506 represents a nonexclusive safe harbor under Section 4(a)(2); therefore, an of-
fering by an issuer satisfying its conditions shall be deemed to be a transaction not involv-
ing any public offering within the meaning of Section 4(a)(2). 49
a. General Characteristics of Rule 506
Rule 506 has the following characteristics: (i) no limitation on the maximum offering
aggregate price; (ii) unlimited accredited purchasers; (iii) no more than 35 non-accredited
purchasers; (iv) affirmative disclosure obligations for non-accredited investors; (v) non-
accredited investors or their representatives must meet sophistication standards; and (vi)
resale of securities is restricted.50
Rule 501 (a) of Regulation D defines accredited investors as: (i) financial institutions, (ii)
pension plans, (iii) venture capital firms, (iv) corporations and other organizations with
assets exceeding US$5 million, (v) insiders and affiliates of the issuer, (vi) natural persons
with net worth in excess of US$1 million or with annual income exceeding US$200,000
(or US$300,000 when combined with spousal income), and (vii) any entity owned by ac-
creditor investors.5 1 The reason why the SEC considered wealth in according the status
of an accredited investor departed from the Ralston Purina line of cases.
44. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT ET. AL, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 281 (James D.
Cox & Robert W. Hillman eds., 6th ed. 2013).
45. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500-230.508.
46. Id. §§ 230.504-230.506.
47. Id.
48. 17 C.F.R. § 230.500.
49. Id. § 230.506.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 230.501.
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Because of the requirement that non-accredited offerees should be sophisticated and the
affirmative disclosure obligation triggered when sophisticated investors were involved, it is
common for issuers to limit their Rule 506 offerings to those offerees that met the accred-
ited investors thresholds.
b. General Solicitation Under Rule 506
Although one important development of Rule 506 was the possibility of offering and
selling securities to an unlimited number of accredited investors, this did not mean the
issuer could use any "machinery of advertising" to offer the securities, at least until 2013.
In fact, general solicitation was originally prohibited under Rule 506.52
The original Rule 502(c) required that the issuer or any person acting on its behalf in a
Rule 506 offering was prohibited from offering securities by any form of general solicita-
tion or advertising.5 3 Additionally, it also sets forth that the simple fact that a solicitation
was directed only to accredited investors would not mean that the solicitation was in com-
pliance with Rule 502(c). 54
The question of when a communication was a general solicitation did not have a simple
answer. Mass mailings were easy cases. Limited and targeted communications, on the
other hand, presented difficult questions. The SEC had established a difference between
limited (allowed) and general (prohibited) communications and said that pre-established
relationships between the issuer (or its representative) and the offeree constituted one of
the ways to guarantee that there was no general advertisement.5 5 In addition, the use of
the Internet for finding potential investors was also considered a violation of the ban on
general solicitation.56
Nevertheless, after the 2008 financial crises, the movement in the U.S. Congress to
increase ways for business to raise capital gained momentum and one of the initiatives was
to authorize general solicitation for Rule 506 offerings. 57
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), enacted on April 5, 2012,
through its section 201(a)(1), directed the SEC to amend Rule 506 to permit general
52. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. SEC Interpretation: Use of Electronic Media, Release Nos. 33-7856, 34-42728, IC-24426, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 231, 241, 271 (2013) (noting that "one method of ensuring that general solicitation is not involved is to
establish the existence of a 'pre-existing, substantive relationship'" and that "there may be facts and circum-
stances in which a third party, other than a registered broker-dealer, could established a 'pre-existing, sub-
stantive relationship' sufficient to avoid a 'general solicitation'").
56. Regarding the use of the Internet, it is worth mentioning the case of IPOnet, where purchasers would
register themselves as accredited investors and, after checked by the IPOnet, such investors would be granted
a password in order to have access to future private placements. This was not considered to be general
solicitation. (See Jill Radloff, Accredited Crowdfunding, Internet Advertising and General Solicitation, DODD
FRANK (April 4, 2013), http://dodd-frank.com/accredited-crowdfunding-internet-advertising-and-general-
solicitation/); see also, Comm'r Op. 96/2C, IPONET/WJ. Gallagher 7 Co., No. OP 6600 (Dep't of Corps.
July 31, 1996).
57. Access to Capital for Job Creators Act, H.R. Rep. 112-263, at 2 (2011) (although this bill was not
adopted, it may be instructive with respect to how Congress viewed the effect of eliminating the prohibition
against general solicitation in private offerings. In its report, the House Committee on Financial Services
stated that "regulations such as the prohibition of general solicitation and advertising in Regulation D Rule
506 offerings inhibit capital formation").
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solicitation or general advertising in offerings made thereunder, provided that all purchas-
ers of the securities were accredited investors.58
Section 201(a)(1) also stated that "[s]uch rules shall require the issuer to take reasonable
steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited investors, using such meth-
ods as determined by the Commission." 59
In short, Section 201(a)(1) of the JOBS Act directed the SEC to amend Rule 506 to
provide that the prohibition against general solicitation contained in Rule 502(c) should
not apply to offers and sales in which all purchasers of the securities are accredited inves-
tors and the issuer takes reasonable steps to verify their status as accredited investors. 60 In
light of many comments from the public, the SEC decided to include in the new Rule
506(c) a nonexclusive list of methods that issuers may use to verify the accredited investor
status of natural persons. 61
In its release adopting these changes to Rule 506,62 the SEC acknowledged the con-
cerns from commentators that the elimination of the ban on general solicitation for a
subset of Rule 506 offerings could affect the behavior of issuers and other market partici-
pants in ways they believed could compromise investor protection.
In order to address some of these concerns, the SEC also amended Rule 506, adopting
the "bad actor" disqualification, 63 through which issuers and other market participants can
be disqualified from relying on Rule 506 if "felons and other 'bad actors'" are participat-
ing in the Rule 506 offerings.
Issuers continue to have the ability under Rule 506(b) to conduct Rule 506 offerings
subject to the prohibition against general solicitation.64 The SEC believed that this would
be important for those issuers that "either do not wish to engage in general solicitation in
their Rule 506 offerings (and become subject to the requirement to take reasonable steps
to verify the accredited investor status of purchasers) or wish to sell privately to non-
accredited investors who meet Rule 506(b)'s sophistication requirements." 65 By retaining
the safe harbor under the existing Rule 506(b), the SEC also expected to benefit investors
with whom an issuer has a preexisting substantive relationship.66
In addition, the JOBS Act did not change the private placement exemption of Section
4(a)(2), which means that an issuer relying on this exemption-outside Rule 506's safe
harbor-is still restricted in its ability to make general solicitations and also subject to all
the guidance and cases briefly discussed in Section B above. 67
58. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313-14 (2012).
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See Eliminating the Prohibition against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and
Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-9415, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 10, 2013).
62. See id.
63. See Disqualification of Felons and Other "Bad Actors" from Rule 506 Offerings, Securities Act Release
No. 33-9414, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,730 (July 10, 2013).
64. See Eliminating the Prohibition against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and
Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,800.
65. Eliminating the Prohibition against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule
144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-9354 (Aug. 29, 2012).
66. See Eliminating the Prohibition against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and
Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,800.
67. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
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IV. Brief Historical Overview of Restricted Offerings Exemption in Brazil
In contrast to the United States, restricted offerings in Brazil are not considered private
sales of securities and therefore the statutory authority underlying the CVM regulation
thereon is not a private sale exemption.6 8
Instead, restricted offerings in Brazil are considered public offerings that are exempt
from registration when such exemption is in the best interest of the public.69 Pursuant to
Section 19(5)(1) of the Brazilian Securities Act, the CVM may issue rules exempting from
registration any public offering when such exemption will further address the public inter-
est than the generally required registration process.70
The first regulation exempting public offerings from registration was enacted by the
CVM in 2009.7 1 Before that, public offerings made to a restricted number of investors
were also subject to the same regulation applicable to public offerings with general solici-
tation: CVM Rule 400. 72
Because of the time and expenses involved in the registration process, 7 3 the CVM was
opened to waive some of the registration requirements for those offerings limited to a
specific predetermined group of qualified buyers and with a small number of securities. In
these cases, the CVM used to waive some registration requirements such as the prepara-
tion of offering material, preliminary and final prospectuses, notices of initial and final
distribution, etc.74
These waivers from registration requirements are allowed under Section(4)(1) of CVM
Rule 400, which states that the CVM may waive some of the registration requirements
thereunder on the basis of (i) the number of securities offered or the size of the offering;
(ii) the manner of the offering; (iii) the quantity and location of the investors; and (iv) the
purchasers' level of sophistication.T5
Once absent a specific safe harbor regulation for restricted offerings, this "waiver-
based" solution was adopted by the CVM to minimize the costs related to the registration




71. See Instrug5o CVM [CVM Rule] No. 480, de 7 de Dezembro de 2009.
72. CVM Rule 400 regulates the registered public offerings in Brazil. See Instruqao CVM [CVM Rule]
No. 400, de 29 de Dezembro de 2003.
73. The full registration process can take more than 60 days starting from the first filing with the CVM.
See id.
74. See, e.g., Processo No. RJ2009/7909, de 8 de Setembro de 2009, Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios
[CVM] (Braz.) (Brookfield Incorporac6es S.A. was relieved from the obligation of preparing a prospectus and
publishing notes of initial and final distribution of its debentures offering. This offering involved the sale of
one debenture but it had to be registered with the CVM so a Fixed-Income registered Hedge-Fund could buy
it); Processo No. 2008/3696, de 9 de Maio de 2008, Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios [CVM] (Braz.)
(Paranapanema S.A. was relieved from the obligation of preparing a prospectus and publishing notes of initial
and final distribution in the newspaper. This offering involved the sale of 1,800 convertible debentures to
pension funds, which could only purchase securities registered with the CVM, being the reason why the
Issuer could not do a private placement; see also Processo No. RJ2004/1690, 2006/6751, 2006/7190, 2006/
7292, 2006/7293, 2006/4383, 2007/7144, 2008/7014, 2008/8432, 2008/11131, 2008/11133, and 2009/368,
Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios [CVM] (Braz.).
75. Instrugoo CVM [CVM Rule] No. 400, de 29 de Dezembro de 2003.
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of those offerings that were restricted to a few qualified investors that could fend for
themselves, such as pension finds, financial institutions, private equity, and hedge ftimds.
76
Many of these small offerings prior to 2009 were substantially private placements that
only needed to be registered with the CVM in order to be purchasable by many of the
larger investment and pension finds in Brazil-which were only allowed to carry regis-
tered securities in their portfolios. 77
Therefore, prior to 2009, the CVM had to decide on a case-by-case basis whether or
not to exempt offerings from registration requirements, considering factors such as (i) the
number of securities offered or the size of the offering; (ii) the manner of the offering; (iii)
the quantity and location of the investors; and (iv) the purchasers' level of sophistication,
which often took time and involved meetings with the CVM staff and multiple letters of
comments from the regulator. 78
In November 2008, inspired by the United States' experience with Regulation D, which
was in place since the early 1980s, the CVM published a draft regulation for comment
establishing for the first time an automatic safe harbor for restricted offerings exempted
from registration. 79 At that time, the CVM report stated that the draft rule "was inspired
by the regulation of other countries, such as the United States, that have similar rules in
place exempting from registration those offerings restricted to qualified buyers and impos-
ing restrictions on these securities negotiations."8 0
V. CVM Rule 476
Rule 476 was enacted in January 2009, exempting from registration those public offer-
ings of securities with restricted selling efforts in the Brazilian capital market.sI As the
CVM made clear at the time, it intended to reduce the costs related to public offerings
with restricted selling efforts to a small number of qualified buyers, making it easier for
issuers to access the capital markets, as long as they met the criteria thereof.82
After the enactment of Rule 476, the CVM decided that, a priori, the registration re-
quirements exemption under Section 4(1) of Rule 400 were no longer available to those
76. See Edital de AudiEncia PIblica No. 05/2008, de 10 de Otubro de 2008, Comissao de Valores
Mobiliarios [CVM] (Braz.).
77. See, e.g., Processo No. RJ2009/7909, de 8 de Setembro de 2009, Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios
[CVM] (Braz.); Processo No. 2008/3696, de 9 de Maio de 2008, Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios [CVM]
(Braz.).
78. See Instrugo CVM [CVM Rule] No. 400, de 29 de Dezembro de 2003.
79. See Edital de Audiencia PIblica No. 05/2008, de 10 de Outubro de 2008, Comissao de Valores
Mobiliarios [CVM] (Braz.).
80. Id. ("A Minuta se inspirou na regulamentagao de outros paises, como os Estados Unidos, que possuem
regras semelhantes de dispensa de registro para ofertas pliblicas dirigidas a investidores qualificados e
permitem a negociaqao desses tfrulos de forma restrita.").
81. See Instrugo CVM [CVM Rule] No. 476, de 16 de Janeiro de 2009.
82. See Edital de Audiencia Piblica No. 05/2008, de 10 de Outubro de 2008, Comissao de Valores
Mobiliarios [CVM] (Braz.).
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offerings that could avail themselves of the safe harbor created by Rule 476.83 In fact, this
has replaced the bulk of waiver requests that were being made to the CVM staff.
84
The creation of this automatic safe harbor has ameliorated the access to capital for
issuers exclusively seeking qualified buyers.85 In addition, it became easier for issuers to
get the right timing for their offerings, because under Rule 476 the issuer may place the
restricted securities before filing anything with the CVM, having only to file Form 476
after the offering is completed.86
A. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RULE 476
Rule 476 allowed issuers to offer a range of non-convertible debt securities and shares
of closed-ended ftmds without registering them with the CVM.8 7 Originally, Rule 476
safe harbor was not available to stock and convertible debt restricted offerings.8 8
With respect to the public investors, restricted offerings in Brazil must be made exclu-
sively to qualified institutional buyers that are: (a) financial institutions; (b) insurance or
annuity companies; (c) private or public pension ftmds; (d) natural or legal persons holding
financial investments worth R$300,000 (Brazilian Real) or more; (e) investment ftmds ex-
clusively held by qualified institutional buyers; or (f) asset managers and financial advisors
authorized by the CVM (with respect to their proprietary portfolio).8 9
In addition to being qualified institutional buyers, each purchaser has to participate with
at least R$1 million in each offering.9 0
Rule 476 has also established a limit on the number of prospective investors and pur-
chasers of the securities for each offering: originally, only fifty qualified institutional buy-
ers could be approached by the issuer/financial advisor, and no more than twenty investors
could actually purchase securities in one restricted offering.91
In September 2014, the CVM amended Rule 476 in order to extend the restricted offer-
ing safe harbor to stocks and convertible debt securities. This amendment to Rule 476
83. See, e.g., Processo No. 2011/4982, de 26 de Julho de 2011, Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios [CVM]
(Braz.); Processo No. RJ2009/6814, de 21 de Janeiro de 2010, Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios [CVM]
(Braz.).
84. In CVM Procedures 2009/6814 and 2011/4982 the regulator decided that, apriori, the exemption from
the registration requirements under Section 4(1) of Rule 400 are not available to those offerings that can avail
themselves of the safe harbor created by Rule 476. See Processo No. 2011/4982, de 26 de Julho de 2011,
Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios [CVM] (Braz.); Processo No. RJ2009/6814, de 21 de Janeiro de 2010,
Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios [CVM] (Braz.).
85. See Instrug5o CVM [CVM Rule] No. 476, de 16 de Janeiro de 2009.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. When the CVM first released Rule 476's draft, it invited the public to comment specifically on the
convenience of allowing equity securities to be eligible to use this exemption; however, regardless of consider-
able public support in favor of it, the CVM decided to permit only debt securities at the time because of its
view that adding stocks or convertible debt securities from the beginning could add "unwanted complexities"
to the restricted offering exemption. See Edital de Audie?ncia Piblica No. 05/2008, de 10 de Outubro de
2008, Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios [CVM] (Braz.).
89. See Instrugao CVM [CVM Rule] No. 476, de 16 de Janeiro de 2009; Instrugao CVM [CVM Rule] No.
409, de 18 de Augusto de 2004.
90. See Instrugoo CVM [CVM Rule] No. 476, de 16 de Janeiro de 2009.
91. See id.
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also increased the limit on the number of prospective investors from fifty to seventy-five,
and on the number of actual purchasers, which rose from twenty to fifty buyers.
92
VI. Comparative Analysis of Rule 476 and Regulation D
Although the CVM has, to a degree, imported some regulatory concepts of restricted
offerings from the United States, Rule 476 is substantially behind in terms of the progress
that the U.S. securities regulations have achieved since the Ralston Purina case in 1953. 9 3
Rule 476 provisions such as (1) the limitation on the amount of qualified purchasers to
fifty investors; (2) the limitation on the amount of prospective investors to seventy-five
potential buyers; (3) the prohibition of general solicitation; and (4) the restriction on the
types of securities that may be offered under Rule 476 were already overhauled-or were
never adopted-in the U.S. securities regulations when the CVM enacted Rule 476. 94 In
fact, the CVM could have, in many ways, taken a larger step towards simplifying the
access to capital in Brazil.
In this respect, the CVM could have gone firther with Rule 476 on at least the follow-
ing points:
a) Limitation on the amount of purchasers toJfity accredited investors: In SEC v. Sunbeam
Gold Mines Co., it was decided-back in 1938 -that the number of purchasers was
not by itself a critical inquiry as to whether the sale of securities was a public or
private transaction, and that "[tio determine the distinction between 'public' and
'private' in any particular context, it is essential to examine the circumstances
under which the distinction is sought to be established and to consider the pur-
poses sought to be achieved by such distinction."95 Also, in Ralston Purina, the
Court decided in 1953 that what matters is the ability of the investors to fend for
themselves and the access to information that these same investors have in order to
make an informed decision.9 6 In addition, Rule 506, enacted in the early 1980s,
had already stated that there should be no limitation to the number of accredited
buyers in restricted offerings. 97 Therefore, Rule 476's limitation on the number
of accredited purchasers to only fifty investors was not well explained and lacks
proper justification. If the CVM allowed fifty highly sophisticated investors to
purchase unregistered securities, why not allow sixty, seventy, or one hundred to
do the same? If the benchmark is that investors should be able to make informed
decisions (quality), the limitation as to the number of investors (quantity) makes
no sense.
b) Limitation on the amount of prospective investors to seventy-five potential buyers: Rule
476 states that the issuer may only seek up to seventy-five qualified institutional
buyers for one specific restricted offering9 s When the draft rule was published
for comments in November 2008, many market participants questioned the limit
92. See Jnstru ao CVM [CVM Rule] No. 551, de 25 de setembro de 2014.
93. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
94. See Instrugoo CVM [CVM Rule] No. 476, de 16 de Janeiro de 2009.
95. SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1938).
96. See Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125-26.
97. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).
98. See Instrugoo CVM [CVM Rule] No. 476, de 16 de Janeiro de 2009.
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on the prospective investors given that the rule also had a limit of twenty actual
purchasers, which already would restrict the offering to a few qualified institu-
tional buyers. 99 These commentators basically argued that the limit on the actual
purchasers should already satisfy the requirement that the offer was "re-
stricted."' 100 In fact, the creation of the limit on the number of prospective inves-
tors was not well justified by the CVM. From the historical analysis of the U.S.
experience above, the number of prospective investors was only used as evidence
of whether a specific transaction violated the private sale exemption. 10 ' The SEC
guidance prior to Ralston Purina used the number of twenty-five investors as one
of the elements that could serve as evidence that the issuer had publicly offered
the securities.1 02 Nevertheless, the Ralston Purina decision, in the 1950s, had al-
ready said that this number was not of great value because an issuer could have a
public offering to only three investors if they were not able to fend for them-
selves.' 0 3 Regulation D did not limit the number of prospective investors either;
as long as there was no general solicitation, which was usually sufficed by the
previously established relationship, there was no limit on the amount of prospec-
tive clients.104 In any case, in adopting this limit, the CVM seems to have ignored
the fact that, in the United States, the restricted offering safe harbor is based in
the private sale exemption. The discussions that took place in the United States
over the importance of the number of prospective investors were in the context of
defining whether a specific transaction was private or public. This is not the case
in Brazil, where the restricted offerings under Rule 476 are expressly said to be
"public offerings."105 So the CVM seems to have borrowed a conceptual guidance
from a different context that does not fit in the Brazilian system. It has created an
unnecessary burden to the issuers and did not give any benefit in exchange.
c) The prohibition of general solicitation: Under Rule 476, issuers are not allowed to do
any kind of general solicitation.10 6 Television or radio advertising, meetings at
places available to the public, as well as any kind of selling efforts through the
"machinery of public distribution" are forbidden 7 In consideration of the recent
lift of the ban on general solicitation under Rule 506, discussed above, the CVM
has taken a wary step towards rule modernization. Considering that restricted
99. See Edital de Audie?ncia Publica No. 05/2008, de 10 de Outubro de 2008, Comissao de Valores
Mobiliarios [CVM] (Braz.).
100. According to the CVM Release for the final Rule 476, relevant private organizations of the Brazilian
capital markets such as the Brazilian Association of Public Companies (Associarao Brasileira de Companhias
Abertas ABRASCA), the Brazilian Association of Investment Banks (Associafdo National de Bancos de hnvesti-
mento ANBID, currently named Associarao Brasileira das E vtidades os Mercados F nanceiro de
Capitais ANBIMA), the Brazilian Association of Foreign Banks (Associaao Brasileira de Bancos Interacion-
ais ABBI), and the Sao Paulo Exchange (BM&FBovespa S.A. Bolsa de Va/ores, Mercadorias e Futuros), ques-
tioned the CVM on the necessity of having a limit on the numbers of investors that could be sought by the
issuer during a restricted offering. See id.
101. See Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 124-25.
102. See id. at 125.
103. See id.
104. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).
105. See Instruoo CVM [CVM Rule] No. 476, de 16 de Janeiro de 2009.
106. See id.
107. See id.
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offerings in the United States are based on a private sale exemption, while in Bra-
zil they are considered public offerings, it should be easier from a legal stand point
for Brazilian regulators to allow general solicitation in restricted offerings than it
is in the United States.Os What historically has kept general solicitation prohib-
ited in U.S. restricted offerings is the fact that these transactions were based on a
private sale statutory exemption. 109 From a legal perspective, the CVM did not
need to import the ban on general solicitation because, in Brazil, restricted offer-
ings are legally considered public offerings.I ° In addition, if the CVM was in-
spired by the U.S. regulatory experience for Rule 476, it could have lifted the ban
on general solicitation, based on the studies and conclusions that the SEC and the
U.S. Congress have arrived at as to the benefits of allowing public solicitation on
restricted offerings: "With the adoption of Rule 506(c) [allowing general solicita-
tion], issuers are expected to have access to a greater number of capital sources
because they will be able to generally solicit investors through a variety of means,
thereby lowering search costs"' . . .The elimination of the prohibition against
general solicitation may enhance the ability of accredited investors to identify and
evaluate investment opportunities in private funds that would not have previously
been available."112 And: "[aiccordingly, for a $5 million offering, which was the
median size of a Regulation D offering with a commission during this period, an
issuer could potentially save up to $250,000 if it solicits investors directly rather
than through an intermediary."" 3
d) The restriction of the Rule 476 regime to a list of "authorized securities" Former
prohibition on stock and convertible-securities in restricted offerings under Rule 476:
Since the enactment of the U.S. Securities Act in 1933, there has not been a dis-
tinction between different types of securities as to the availability of the private
sales or restricted offerings exemption. As long as the investors were able to ac-
cess and interpret the issuer's information necessary for them to make an in-
formed investment decision, the exemption could be available irrespective of the
asset type. If Rule 476 is to allow investors capable of fending for themselves to
purchase unregistered securities, there is no reason why to limit Rule 476 safe
108. In fact, I believe that the U.S. Congress could not have determined the lift of the ban on general
solicitation of Rule 506 without reflecting that change on the private sale statutory exemption of the U.S.
Securities Act. It is really contradictory to allow general solicitation if the statutory authorization for such
rule is a "private sale exemption," for the simple fact that an offering made to the whole country could not be
considered private.
109. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).
110. See Instrugoo CVM [CVM Rule] No. 476, de 16 de Janeiro de 2009.
111. See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9416, 78 Fed.
Reg. 44,806 (July 24, 2013).
112. See id.
113. See Eliminating the Prohibition against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and
Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-9415, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 10, 2013). ("An analysis
of all Form D filings submitted between 2009 to 2012 shows that approximately 11% of all new Regulation D
offerings reported sales commissions of greater than zero because the issuers used intermediaries. The aver-
age commission paid to these intermediaries was 5.9% of the offering size, with the median commission being
approximately 5%. Accordingly, for a $5 million offering, which was the median size of a Regulation D
offering with a commission during this period, an issuer could potentially save up to $250,000 if it solicits
investors directly rather than through an intermediary, minus the cost of its own solicitation efforts and the
cost associated with verifying accredited investor status.").
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harbor to a list of authorized securities. As mentioned above, CVM has only re-
cently changed Rule 476 in order to include stocks in this safe harbor. Perhaps
the reason envisioned by the CVM in 2009 for leaving stocks out of Rule 476 was
because investing in stocks implies more risks than investing in fixed-income se-
curities. Of course, stocks can be riskier than bonds. But it is hard to imagine that
accredited investors with multi-million Brazilian Real in their portfolios-such as
those generally qualified to participate in Rule 476 offerings-were able to assess
the risks of investing in bonds but not in stocks of the same issuer. Even more, if
the accredited investor feels comfortable enough to purchase a stock from a risky
issuer, he/she is presumed to be sophisticated enough to assume the risks thereof.
The whole purpose of creating a category of accredited investors is exactly so the
CVM does not need to spend time and resources protecting and overseeing in-
vestments made by those accredited few that can fend for themselves. The CVM
has taken an important step towards modernization of restricted offerings in Brazil
by including stocks among the authorized securities, although Rule 476 could sim-
ply exclude the list of authorized securities thereof, making this safe harbor availa-
ble to any kind of securities.
VII. Conclusion
Both the United States and Brazil have safe harbor regulations for restricted offerings.
In the United States, this regulation developed from the historical construction and gui-
dance of the private placement exemption set forth in Section 4(a)(2) of the U.S. Securities
Regulations. From 1933 until the early 1980s, with the enactment of Regulation D, the
restricted offering exemption was dependent on the decisions by the courts and the gui-
dance provided by the SEC on the private placement exemption. Regulation D created a
safe harbor with more predictable terms for issuers willing to perform restricted offerings
of securities.
In Brazil, the restricted offerings regulation only came about in January 2009 with the
enactment of Rule 476. Before 2009, restricted offerings needed to be registered with the
CVM through the general registration process applicable to public offerings. Because of
the time and expense related to this process, the CVM used to waive some of the registra-
tion requirements such as the preparation of preliminary and final prospectuses and the
publication of notice of initial and final distribution.
Rule 476 is considerably overdue in terms of regulatory modernization because of some
of its provisions, such as (1) the limitation on the amount of qualified purchasers to fifty
investors; (2) the limitation on the amount of prospective investors to seventy-five offer-
ees; (3) the prohibition of general solicitation; and (4) the restriction of the Rule 476
regime to a list of "authorized securities". Although some parts of Rule 476 were inspired
by the United States' experience with restricted offerings, most of these provisions were
already overhauled in-or were never adopted from-the U.S. securities regulations in
2009, when the Rule 476 was enacted.
Restricted offerings increase economic growth and job creation by improving access to
the capital markets for companies and entrepreneurs. The Brazilian capital markets would
welcome changes towards modernization of Rule 476.
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